

## ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) MECHANISMS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS SOCIAL CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA

**Okonkwo, Raphael Valentine, Ph.D<sup>1</sup>**

Department of Marketing, Michael Okpara University of Agriculture  
Umudike-Umuahia, Nigeria. Email: rvo1972@yahoo.com.

**Odigbo, Ben. Ejikeme, Ph.D<sup>2</sup>**

Department of Marketing, University of Calabar, Nigeria.  
Email: ben.odigbo@unical.edu.ng

**Odigbo, Rose Ada<sup>3</sup>**

Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus.  
Tel: 234-8037003791. Email: rosedannia@yahoo.com

### Abstract

The study undertook a critical appraisal of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a tool for conflict prevention, management and resolutions in Nigeria. It is motivated by the intractable social conflicts that are threatening to tear the country apart, ranging from the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani herdsmen attacks, Niger Delta militancy to the Indigenous People of Biafra problem. The main objectives sought were to determine the efficacy of traditional alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms like traditional rulers, religious leaders and social groups like Umu-ada as opposed to the use of force in resolving social conflicts amongst Nigerians. Survey research technique was employed in the study. Data procured from the field were statistically analyzed. Results obtained reveal that the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) bodies like traditional rulers, religious leaders and reputable traditional social groups will be more effective for the prevention, management and resolutions of social conflicts in Nigeria than the use of force. Based on these outcomes, the use of ADR bodies is recommended for Nigerian authorities in handling social conflicts in the country rather than the use of force.

**Keywords:** Alternative Dispute Resolution, Conflict Prevention and Management, Justice Mechanism, Nigeria.

### Introduction

Ethnic, religions, communal, social and political conflicts in Nigeria are threatening the unity of the Nigeria nation and its socio-economic and political development. Foreigners are being discouraged from investing in the country, making foreign direct investment very low, with a consequent negative effect on employment generation. Today, there are fears whether the country's unity and its fledgling democracy will survive, talkless of its avowed dream march into one of the developed nations of the world (Ugwuanyi & Odigbo, 2013). In recent time, terrorism dimensions to violence have also entered the Nigerian social history, with social violence now the order of the day (Odigbo, Ugwu-Ogbu & Okonkwo, 2016; Amadi, 2011; Osai, 2011).

The numerous social conflicts include the "Boko Haram" crisis, a group campaigning for the imposition of Sharia law on some states of the Nigerian federation, alleged to be sponsored by some politicians (Okonjo-Iweala, 2014), the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), two groups fighting for self-determination in the country, Niger Delta militants campaigning for resource control

(Okonta, 2001), the Fulani herdsmen whose mission is shrouded in mystery, the Odua Congress, one of the marginalization agitators and many more (Obasanjo, 2002; Abati, 2008).

The Government of Nigeria had at sundry times used military force in containing some of these agitations, ranging from the “Operation Python Dance 1 & 2”, the “Operation Crocodile Smile,” the “Joint Military Task Force (JTF),” and such other military operations on civilians. This style has been criticized at both local and international levels. This school of thought believes that the use of dialogue through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms involving established credible social institutions would give a better and quicker panacea to the problem. Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) refers to any means of settling disputes outside of the courtroom. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), also known as external dispute resolution in some countries, includes dispute resolution processes and techniques that fall outside of the government judicial process. It acts as a means for disagreeing parties to come to an agreement short of litigation. It is a collective term for the ways that parties can settle disputes, with (or without) the help of a third party (Odigbo, Anuforo & Odigbo, 2012).

The major thrust of this study, therefore, was to ascertain the potency or otherwise of the use of Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) institutions as a tool for preventing and settling social conflicts between the government and citizens of Nigeria.

### **Statement of the Problem**

For some years now, the Nigerian nation has become a hot-bed of one social conflict or the other, all of which are posing threats to the fragile peace and unity of the country. This rising trend of social conflicts have been occasioned by perceived allegations of marginalization and injustices by the aggrieved groups. The agitations are fueled by either religious colorations like in the Boko Haram case, resource control like the Niger Delta militancy or self-determination like the Biafra course. While some criticize the Federal Government of Nigeria for using undue force against these citizens’ agitations, others applaud them. According to Okoro (2002), public relations alternative disputes’ resolution communications strategies would have been a veritable tool for stemming citizens’ restiveness and violence in the country. Ndolo (2004) also says that dialogue through subtle public relations strategies rather than the use of force is a good option of choice in tackling social conflicts involving your citizens who are not your enemies.

### **Research Objectives**

The study sought to address the following specific objectives:

- i. To ascertain the effect of traditional rulers as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- ii. To determine the effect of religious leaders as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- iii. To determine the effect of use of traditional social groups as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

### **Research Questions**

The following research questions guided the study:

- i. Will traditional rulers serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria?
- ii. To what extent could religious leaders serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria?

- iii. To what extent could the use of traditional social groups serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria?

### **Research Hypotheses**

The following null-hypotheses were tested in the study:

- i. Traditional rulers will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- ii. Religious leaders will not be an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- iii. Traditional social groups will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

### **Scope of the Study**

The study is a critical examination of the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) institutions as a tool for preventing and settling social conflicts in Nigeria. The area of study was the South-east and South-south parts of the country, where one representative State each (Enugu and Cross River) were used. The sample scope included men, women and youths aged between 20 to 65 years.

### **Literature Review**

#### **Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical underpinning for this work hinges on three theories/models: the theory of equality and proportional equality, the public relations attitudinal transfer-process model and the public relations two-way symmetrical model.

#### **The Theory of Equality and Proportional Equality**

The principle of equality holds that all human beings are equal before God and all citizens are equal before the law. Equality in this sense has a close connection with morality and justice in general and distributive justice in particular. From antiquity onward, equality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. Hence, philosophers like Aristotle and Plato affirmed that there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional equality (Aristotle, 1130b-1132b; Plato, 757b-c). Numerical equality is based on the treatment of others or distribution of commonwealth benefits equal numerically. It treats all persons as indistinguishable, identically and grants them the same quantity of a good per capita. That could be what the agitators for resource control, self-determination and restructuring are indirectly clamouring for.


In contrast, proportional equality is a form of treatment of others or distribution benefits proportionally or relatively equal by treating all relevant persons in relation to their due. The proponents of this school of thought believe that when numerical equality is just, it is the same as proportional equality. For instance, the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria buttress their agitations under the proportional equality principle that he who produces more of the nation's wealth, should also get more of the allocations. This they achieved through the 13 percent oil derivative allocation, which however, does not seem to satisfy those calling for outright resource control.

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally. This principle holds that equal input results in equal output and demands equal benefit. Both Aristotle and Plato believe that persons should be

assessed according to their differing deserts, based on the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion, and that reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Both believe that proportional equality is the only basis for true social justice.

### The PR Attitudinal Transfer Process Model

**Fig. 1: The PR Attitudinal Transfer Process Model**



**Source: Jefkins, Frank (1987), *Public relations and planned press*, London: Macmillan publishers, p.45.**

The public relations Transfer Process Model propounded by Frank Jefkins (1987), is a model which explains and shows how public relations can be used or applied to change hostility among a given target publics to sympathy, prejudice to acceptance, apathy to interest, and ignorance to knowledge. It can be used or applied as a guide in handling specific public relations problems or projects, and can also be used as a guide or frame work for planning and executing the overall public relations programme of any organisation or corporate entity (Nwosu, 1996:112). The three tiers of government in Nigeria could therefore employ this model in transferring the increasing rates of agitations, restiveness and apathy amongst Nigerian citizens today to sympathy for their country, interest in their country, acceptance of government's efforts and knowledge of the true position of affairs. This could be used to change the attitudes of members of the Boko Haram, the Niger Delta militants, the IPOB and such other agitators positively.

**The 2-Way Symmetrical Model:** Propounded by Grunig and Hunt (1988), this public relations model uses communication to negotiate with the publics, resolve conflicts, and promote mutual understanding and respect between a government, an institution, an organization or even an individual with their public(s). If it's the government, the 2-way symmetrical model believes that the governmental public relations and information managers should not take sides against the citizens, but should rather play the roles of mediator versus persuader between the government and the citizens. Under this model, they must try to help the citizens understand government's positions and also help the government understand the citizens' positions themselves, and then ensure they adapt to one another and achieve a meeting point acceptable to all. This model also tagged public relations excellence model, therefore, has no room for the use of force to ram any governmental position down the throats of citizens, because that will only lead to suppressed animosity.

## **Dispute and Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR)**

Disputes is defined as a disagreement, controversy, contention, altercation, quarrel, conflict, strife, discord, antagonism or argument between two or more individuals or groups. According to Anyebe (2007), disputes are inevitable in any social context, because human beings are found to disagree on and at almost every point in life. As long as human beings interact, disagreements and disputes are bound to occur. This is due to conflict of diverse interests amongst human beings. Meanwhile, the way and manner the disputes are resolved, to a large extent, differentiates a modern from a primitive society. In the primitive age, disputes are settled with brute force; it was a matter of a rule of might or strength. However, in modern societies, the rule of law takes precedence in dispute resolutions, through litigations or ADR as integral part of socio-economic development of any people or society (Anyebe, 2007).

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), on the other hand, could be defined as any mechanism or means of settling disputes outside of the courtroom. It includes dispute resolution processes and techniques that fall outside of the government judicial process. ADR represents a move away from the formal court process to an informal process. Under the ADR, getting the problem resolved quickly is more important than placing blames or winning a case (Idornigie, 2005; Anyebe, 2007).

### **ADR and Social Conflicts in Nigeria**

Odigbo, Anuforo and Odigbo, (2013), observed that there are a host of traditional institutions for the maintenance of peace, social order and dispute mediation/resolutions in African traditional societies. These institutions are often very powerful, highly respected and highly regarded by the people. This is because, the native laws and customs enforced by them are often thought as passed on from sanctified ancestors and gods whom it would be a sacrilege to disobey in order not to incur a dangerous curse as penalty (Onyemaechi, 2009). For instance, the people of Edo State believes it is a sacrilege to disobey the Oba of Benin. So also do the northern Moslems regard most of the Emirs. In Yoruba land, it is a forbidden sin to disobey the Oba of Ife, while in Igbo Land the rulings of umuada or umuokpu is like that of a traditional supreme court. Such traditional groups exist amongst all ethnic groups in Nigeria and should therefore be carried along in managing social conflicts in the land.

### **ADR and the Nigerian Judicial System**

Oraegbunam (2011) pointed out that while the Nigerian courts accept traditional rulings of ADR in some cases, they reject them in other cases, prompting him to say that the relationship between the orthodox court system and the traditional system is like that of a master and his servant. However, ADR rulings continues to receive the blessing of the Supreme Court of Nigeria like in the case of *Egesimba v. Onuzurike*. Thus, customary arbitration by elders of the community is one of many African customary modes of settling disputes and once it satisfies the necessary requirements, the decision would have binding effect on the parties and this creates an estoppel. It is recognized under Nigerian jurisprudence (Oraegunam, 2011).

However, there are some ADR systems or measures which the Nigerian Courts still frown at. For instance, in respect to oath-taking in customary arbitration, the courts denied validity to oath-taking as a means of settlement of dispute. For example, in *Iwuchukwu v. Anyanwu, Ndoma – Egba J. C.A* stated: The belief of the learned trial judge that disputes are decided by swearing “Juju” may be true as a matter of the past. In this century, that will be a retreat to trial by ordeal which is unthinkable any more than swearing ‘Juju’ as a method of proof. It is a reel back to superstitious fear and foreswear. Again, in *Onwuanunkpa v. Onwuanunkpa*, the

court blatantly condemned practice of arbitration based on oath-taking as not being arbitration at all.

These notwithstanding, the Nigerian Courts welcome any alternative dispute resolution that follows sound processes, and even sometimes advise parties to a dispute to go and settle out-of-court, or come back if they are unable to do so.

### Methodology

The study adopted survey design. Data were sourced through structured-questionnaire administered on fairly literate Nigerians of between 20 to 65 years selected from two States in the South-east and South-south parts of country: Enugu from the South-East and Cross River from the South-south. The population of the study was 600,000, from which a sample size of 300 was judgmentally determined. Purposive sampling technique was employed in administering the questionnaire. 280 copies of the questionnaire administered, representing 93.40% were filled and returned by the respondents. Data analysis was by SPSS (Version 20), and the statistical tools of chi-square and Spearman's correlation coefficient.

### Data Presentation and Analysis

#### Demographic Profiles of the Respondents

From the data procured and processed, the demographic profiles of the respondents indicate that 30.02% were aged between 20 to 29 years, 33.60% were in the age range of 30 to 39 years, another 30.62% were in the age range of 40 to 49 years; while the remaining 5.76% were 50 years or above. This shows that adults of all age groups were accommodated in the study. All the respondents were literate enough to understand the subject matter.

**Table 1: Respondents' views on the effect of traditional rulers as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	104	37.14%
Agree	114	40.71%
Undecided	39	13.92%
Disagree	13	4.64%
Strongly Disagree	10	3.57%
<b>Total</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Field survey, 2017.

Data displayed on table 1 reveal that 37.14% of the respondents strongly agreed that traditional rulers will be effective as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria. 40.71% of the respondents equally agreed with that; 13.92% were undecided; 4.64% disagreed, while the remaining 3.57% strongly disagreed with the point.

**Table 2: Respondents' views on the effect of religious leaders as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	107	38.21%
Agree	121	43.21%
Undecided	30	10.71%
Disagree	13	5.71%
Strongly Disagree	9	3.21%
<b>Total</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Field survey, 2017.

Data displayed on table 2 show that 38.21% of the respondents strongly agreed that religious leaders will be significantly effective as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria. 43.21% of the respondents equally agreed with that; 10.71% were not quite sure; 5.71% disagreed, while the remaining 3.21% strongly disagreed with the point.

**Table 3: Respondents' views on the effect of traditional social groups as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	110	39.29%
Agree	122	43.21%
Undecided	22	7.86%
Disagree	19	6.79%
Strongly Disagree	7	2.50%
<b>Total</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Field survey, 2017.

Data displayed on table 3 show that 39.29% of the respondents strongly agreed that **traditional social groups will be effective as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria**. 43.21% of the respondents equally agreed with that; 7.86% were undecided; 6.79% disagreed, while the remaining 2.50% strongly disagreed with the point.

### Test of Hypotheses

#### Hypothesis One

H<sub>0</sub>: Traditional rulers will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

H<sub>1</sub>: Traditional rulers will serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

**TABLE 4 Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.574 <sup>a</sup>	.202	-.109	.212

Predictors: (Constant), ANTENATAL

#### ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.002	1	.002	.191	.588 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	2.915	93	.032		
	Total	2.917	94			

Dependent Variable: Traditional Rulers -- Predictors: (Constant), Social Peace

### Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	1.225	.066		18.115	.002
<b>Social Peace</b>	-.033	.093	-.025	-.321	.588

The table indicates there is a significant positive relationship between traditional rulers and social peace in the country at **R= .574 which is 57 percent; R<sup>2</sup> = .202, p. = 0.002 < 0.05**. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis that says, Traditional rulers will serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

### Hypothesis Two

Ho: Religious leaders will not be an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

Hi: Religious leaders will be an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

**Test Statistics** = Chi-Square ( $X^2$ )

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{O - E}{E}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Expected Frequency} &= \sum \frac{\text{Observed Frequency}}{\text{Number of Observations}} \\ &= \frac{107 + 121 + 30 + 13 + 9}{5} = 56 \end{aligned}$$

Degree of Freedom = 4. Hence, Critical Chi-Square at 5% Margin of Error = 9.49

$$\begin{aligned} X^2 &= \frac{(107 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(121 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(30 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(13 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(9 - 56)^2}{56} \\ &= 46.44 + 75.44 + 12.07 + 33.01 + 39.45 \\ &= 206.41 \end{aligned}$$

### Decision

Since the calculated chi-square ( $X^2_{\text{calculated}} = 206.41, p < 0.05$ ) is greater than the critical chi-square (9.49), we hereby reject the Ho and accept the Hi which says that “Religious leaders will be an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.”

### Hypothesis Three

Ho: Traditional social groups will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

Hi: Traditional social groups will serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

**Test Statistics** = Chi-Square ( $X^2$ )

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{O - E}{E}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Expected Frequency} &= \frac{\sum \text{Observed Frequency}}{\text{Number of Observations}} \\ &= \frac{110 + 122 + 22 + 19 + 7}{5} = 56 \end{aligned}$$

Degree of Freedom = 4. Hence, Critical Chi-Square at 5% Margin of Error = 9.49

$$\begin{aligned} X^2 &= \frac{(110 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(122 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(22 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(19 - 56)^2}{56} + \frac{(7 - 56)^2}{56} \\ &= 48.04 + 77.02 + 15.54 + 29.45 + 43.55 \\ &= 213.60 \end{aligned}$$

### Decision

Since the calculated chi-square ( $X^2_{\text{calculated}} = 213.60$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) is greater than the critical chi-square (9.49), we hereby reject the  $H_0$  and accept the  $H_1$  which says that “Traditional social groups will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.”

### Summary of Findings and their Implications

A summary of the findings of the study indicate that:

- i. Traditional rulers will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- ii. Religious leaders will not be an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- iii. Traditional social groups will not serve as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.

The implications of the result number one is that for there to be enduring social peace in Nigeria, the institution of traditional rulers must be extensively used for alternative dispute resolution matters. It is still one of the veritable socio-cultural traditional institutions that commands respect amongst the citizens. This result agrees with Odigbo, Ugwu-Ogbu & Okonkwo (2016), that de-emphasizing the employment of mass media and laying of emphasis more on African traditional media (oramedia) which invariably includes the traditional rulers, as a political marketing and public relations communications tool will provide a better antidote for curbing electoral violence in Nigeria. It also aligns with the report of Osho (2011), that African traditional media (oramedia) tools are particularly more effective channel of communication amongst the Africa populace because of their uniqueness in the modern age which includes the widespread of usage amongst the people, its better appeal, deep effect and easy assimilation by the people.

The implications of result number two is that religious leaders are not being sufficiently used in Nigeria, as a vehicle for peace-building and engineering in the country. This may not be unconnected with the fact that for some time now, majority of the religious leaders have lost credibility, due to their unbridled emphasis on material wealth and relegation of sanctimonious religious virtues to the background.

The implication of number three result is that traditional social groups are very inevitable as alternative dispute resolution tools for checkmating social conflicts and social violence in Nigeria. This result finds support in Odigbo, Anuforo and Odigbo (2013) that other African countries also practice alternative dispute resolution (ADR), like the Gikuyu elders of Kenya

who have a long history of prevention of strife between members of lineages and the prevention of deadly conflicts in which people would resort to supernatural powers or open hostilities, bloodshed and destruction of property Anyacho and Ugal (2009). Again, the Kpelle people of Liberia have a well-established ADR forum called “House of Palavar,” made up of an ad-hoc council of kinsmen and neighbours of parties in conflict, for informal settlement of conflicts. Every claim was investigated with honesty and at the end, just judgment was delivered and all parties involved shared a drink. Then, among the Oromo people of East Africa, there is also the “Gada” system, an institution for the prevention of strife amongst the people and restoration of social harmony in the area (Anyacho and Ugal, 2009).

### Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are proffered:

- i. The Federal Government of Nigeria should consider the use of traditional rulers will as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for significantly checkmating social conflicts and crises in Nigeria.
- ii. The three tiers of government in Nigeria should also employ religious leaders as effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for peace-building and engineering in Nigeria.
- iii. The employment of credible traditional social institutions as an alternative dispute resolution instrument for promoting and sustaining social peace in Nigeria, should be a must in the country.
- iv. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) should be made a compulsory part of the country’s judicial system and justice-dispensation system, but with proper regulation and monitoring.

### References

- Abati, Reuben (2008). “Social Violence in Nigeria: A Revisit”. *THIS DAY*, July 5, 2008, P2.
- Amadi, Sam (2011). Stop This Bombings in Nigeria. *Daily Independent*, February 24, P5.
- Aristotle (1130b-1132b); Nicomachean Ethics.  
<http://aristotle.stanford.edu/entries/equality/#PriEquJus.cf>.
- Anyacho, E. O. and Ugal David B. (2009), Modernization and Traditional Methods of Social Control in Obudu L.G.A. of Cross River State, Nigeria, Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513969>
- Anyebe, Peter A. (2012), “Towards fast tracking justice delivery in civil proceedings in Nigeria.” Lagos: Government Press.
- Grunig, J.E. (2001). “Two-way symmetrical public relations: Past, present, and future.” Handbook of public relations. R. Heath and G. Vasquez. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, Inc.: 11-30.
- Idornigie, Paul O. (2005), "From Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) To Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): Jurisdictional And Evidential Issues - Paper I Commissioned for presentation at the 2005 Annual Conference of the NBA holding in Jos, Plateau Slate, 28th August - 4th September. 2005.
- Jefkins, Frank (1987), *Public Relations and Planned Press*, London: Macmillan Publishers, p.112.
- Ndolo, Ike S. (2004): “The Role of the Media in the Attainment of Peace in Nigeria,” UNN Journal of Mass communication, Vol. 1, No.1, March.
- Nwosu, Ikechukwu E. (1996), *Public Relations Management: Principles, Issues, Applications*, Lagos: Dominican Publishers.

- Obasanjo, Olusegun (2002), "Steps To Avoid Violence in Nigerian Politics" Report Submitted to the House of Representative.
- Odigbo, Ben E.; Ugwu-Ogbu, Silk & Okonkwo, Raphael Valentine (2016), Appraisal of africa traditional media (oramedia) as communication tools for effective management of electoral violence in Nigeria. *Asian Journal of Empirical Research* Volume 6, Issue 6 pp. 142-151. <http://aessweb.com/journal-detail.php?id=5004>.
- Odigbo, Ben. E.; Anuforo, Robert & Odigbo, Ada, Rose (2013), Curbing social inequalities and gender-based injustices in Igboland: The role of public relations and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) bodies.
- Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi (2014), Politicians are the ones behind Boko Haram - <http://www.porscheclassy.com.ng/news/politicians-ones-behind-boko-haram-okonjo-iweala/>
- Okonta, John and Douglas, V. (2001), Niger-Delta Crisis: Where vultures feast, <http://www.next.com/Csp/ems/sites/nextnews/nigeria>. Retrieved 20/08/2011.
- Okoro, Okeke N. (200): "Using Public Relations to Stem Youth Violence," *Journal of Public Relations Management*, Vol 1, No 3.
- Onyemaechi, Uzoma (2009), Igbo Culture and Socialization, [http://www.kwenu.com/igbo/igbowebpages/Igbo.dir/Culture/culture\\_and\\_socialization.html](http://www.kwenu.com/igbo/igbowebpages/Igbo.dir/Culture/culture_and_socialization.html).
- Oraegbunam, Ikenga K. E. (2011), "Crime and Punishment In Igbo Customary Law: The Challenge Of Nigerian Criminal Jurisprudence" [www.ajol.info/index.php/og/article/viewFile/57917/46285](http://www.ajol.info/index.php/og/article/viewFile/57917/46285)
- Osai, Jude (2010), Governors meet on Crisis in Nigeria, *Tribune*, February 16, P11.
- Osho, S. A. (2011). *The uniqueness of African means of communication in a contemporary world*. <http://www.africanoutlookonline.com/index.php?> Retrieved 11/04/2013.
- Plato (VI.757b-c). *Laws*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/#PriEquJus>.
- Ugwuanyi, Uche & Odigbo, Ben (2012), Public Relations Strategies for Managing Religious, Ethnic and Social Conflicts For the Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Development In Nigeria. *European Journal of Business and Management* Vol 4, No.17, p.40-52.